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Abstract
Recommender systems, tool for predicting users’ potential prefer-
ences by computing history data and users’ interests, show an increas-
ing importance in various Internet applications such as online shopping.
As a well-known recommendation method, neighbourhood-based col-
laborative filtering has attracted considerable attention recently. The
risk of revealing users’ private information during the process of fil-
tering has attracted noticeable research interests. Among the current
solutions, the probabilistic techniques have shown a powerful privacy
preserving effect. The existing methods deploying probabilistic meth-
ods are in three categories, one [19] adds differential privacy noises
in the covariance matrix; one [1] introduces the randomisation in the
neighbour selection process; the other [29] applies differential privacy
in both the neighbour selection process and covariance matrix. When
facing k Nearest Neighbour (kNN) attack, all the existing methods
provide no data utility guarantee, for the introduction of global ran-
domness. In this paper, to overcome the problem of recommendation
accuracy loss, we propose a novel approach, Partitioned Probabilistic
Neighbour Selection, to ensure a required prediction accuracy while
maintaining high security against kNN attack. We define the sum of
k neighbours’ similarity as the accuracy metric α, the number of user
partitions, across which we select the k neighbours, as the security
metric β. We generalise the k Nearest Neighbour attack to βk Nearest
Neighbours attack. Differing from the existing approach that selects
neighbours across the entire candidate list randomly, our method se-
lects neighbours from each exclusive partition of size k with a decreas-
ing probability. Theoretical and experimental analysis show that to
provide an accuracy-assured recommendation, our Partitioned Proba-
bilistic Neighbour Selection method yields a better trade-off between
the recommendation accuracy and system security.
Keywords: Privacy preserving, Differential privacy, Neighbourhood-
based collaborative filtering recommender systems, Internet Commerce
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1 Introduction
Recommender systems predict users’ potential preferences by aggregating
history data and users’ interests. Recently, an increasing importance of rec-
ommender systems has been shown in various Internet applications. For
example, Amazon has been receiving benefits for a decade from the recom-
mender systems by providing personal recommendation to their customers,
and Netflix posted a one million U.S. dollars award for improving their rec-
ommender system to make their business more profitable [10, 15, 25]. Cur-
rently, in recommender systems, Collaborative Filtering (CF) is a famous
technology with three main popular techniques [17], i.e., neighbourhood-
based methods [14], association rules based prediction [24], and matrix fac-
torisation [16]. Among these techniques, neighbourhood-based methods are
the most widely used in the industry because of its easy implementation and
high prediction accuracy.
One of the most popular neighbourhood-based method is k Nearest
Neighbour (kNN) which provides recommendations by aggregating the opin-
ions of a user’s k nearest neighbours [2]. Although kNN recommender sys-
tems present very good performance of recommendation accuracy efficiently,
the risk of revealing users’ private information during the process of filtering
is still a growing concern, e.g., the kNN attack presented by Calandrino et
al. [5] exploits the property that the users are more similar when sharing
same rating on corresponding items to reveal user’s private data. Thus pre-
senting an efficient privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF algorithm
against kNN attack, which achieves a trade-off between the system security
and recommendation accuracy, has been a natural research interest.
The literature in CF recommender systems has developed several ap-
proaches to preserve users’ privacy. Generally, cryptographic, obfuscation,
perturbation, probabilistic methods and differential privacy are applied [29].
Among them, cryptographic methods [11, 21] provide the most reliable se-
curity but the unnecessary computational cost cannot be ignored. Obfus-
cation methods [22, 27] and Perturbation methods [3, 4] introduce designed
random noise into the original matrix to preserve customers’ sensitive in-
formation; however the magnitude of noise is hard to calibrate in these two
types of methods [9, 29]. The probabilistic methods [1] provided a similar-
ity based weighted neighbour selection of the k nearest neighbours. Similar
to perturbation, McSherry et al. [19] presented a naive differential privacy
method which adds calibrated noise into the covariance (similarity between
users/items) matrix. Similar to the probabilistic neighbour selection [1],
Zhu et al. [29] proposed a Private Neighbour Selection to preserve privacy
against kNN attack by introducing differential privacy in selecting the k
nearest neighbours randomly (also adding noise into covariance matrix with
differential privacy). Although the methods in [1, 19, 29] successfully pre-
serve users’ privacy against kNN attack, the low prediction accuracy due to
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the global randomness should be noted. Even worse, [29] failed to maintain
differential privacy in the process of neighbour selection. Therefore, none
of the existing privacy preserving CF recommender systems can provide
enough utility while preserving users’ private information.
Motivation. The current privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF
methods did not guarantee the data utility against kNN attack. Therefore,
in this paper, we aim to present a privacy preserving neighbourhood-based
CF recommendation scheme which satisfies the following properties:
(1) Easy implementation.
(2) Absolutely keep differential privacy.
(3) Significantly decrease the magnitude of noise in differential privacy.
(4) Quantify the level of recommendation accuracy and system security.
Actually, it is clear that the probabilistic methods (including naive prob-
abilistic methods and differential privacy methods) are efficient methods
against kNN attack; however, because of the global noises, the neighbour
quality, namely the prediction accuracy, is impacted significantly. Thus, to
decrease the magnitude of differential privacy noise, we may propose the
following approach: we can simply add Laplace noise to the final rating
prediction after the normal kNN CF recommendation. But Sarathy et al.
has shown in [23] that the above method will release users’ privacy because
Laplace mechanism does not work well in numeric data. So, to control the
neighbour quality and to decrease the magnitude of noise, it is natural to
avoid the global randomness and repeatedly adding noise. Therefore, we
present a partitioned probabilistic neighbour selection method without any
perturbations in the process of rating prediction.
Contributions. In this paper, to overcome the problems of low recom-
mendation accuracy, we propose a novel method, Partitioned Probabilistic
Neighbour Selection. The main contributions of this paper are:
(1) We expand the classic kNN attack to a more general case, β-kNN
attack, which flexibly adjusts the size of fake user’s set to improve the attack
effectiveness. β is essentially regarded as a security measure denoting the
degree of difficulty for an attacker to break the neighbourhood-based CF
recommender systems. We are the first to consider the case when β > 1.
(2) To protect users’ data privacy against β-kNN attack, we propose
a novel differential privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF method,
which ensures a required prediction accuracy while achieving a better trade-
off between the system security and recommendation accuracy against kNN
attack.
(3) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a theoretical
analysis of the recommendation accuracy and system security on the recom-
mendation results from any randomised neighbour selection methods in the
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neighbourhood-based CF recommender systems. Previous related work only
gave the experimental analysis on the same issues.
Organisation. The rest of this paper is organised as follows: In Sec-
tion 2, we summarise both the advantages and disadvantages in the existing
privacy preserving methods on CF recommender systems. In Section 3, we
introduce the relevant background knowledge in this paper. In Section 4, we
introduce an existing attack to neighbourhood-based CF recommender sys-
tems, then expand it to a general case, β-kNN attack. Next, We proposed a
novel differential privacy recommendation approach, Partitioned Probabilis-
tic Neighbour Selection, in Section 5. Afterwards, the theoretical analysis
of our approach on the performance of both recommendation accuracy and
system security are provided in Section 6. Then, in Section 7, we show
the experimental evaluation results. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude this
paper.
2 Related Work
A noticeable number of literature has been published to preserve customers’
private data in recommender systems. However, Calandrino et al. [5] pro-
posed a neighbourhood-based CF attack, kNN attack, which is a serious
privacy threat to the neighbourhood-based CF recommender systems in e-
commerce, e.g., Amazon. In this section, we briefly discuss some of the
research literature in privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF recom-
mender systems.
2.1 Traditional Privacy Preserving Recommender Systems
Amount of traditional privacy preserving methods have been developed in
CF recommender systems [29], including cryptographic [11, 21], obfusca-
tion [22,27], perturbation [3,4] and probabilistic methods [1]. Erkin et al. [11]
applied homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation in pri-
vacy preserving recommender systems, which allows users to jointly compute
their data to receive recommendation without sharing the true data with
other parties. Nikolaenko et al. [21] combined a famous recommendation
technique, matrix factorization, and a cryptographic method, garbled cir-
cuits, to provide recommendations without learning the real user ratings
in database. The Cryptographic methods provide the highest guarantee
for both prediction security ans system security by introducing encryption
rather than adding noise to the original record. Unfortunately, unnecessary
computational cost impacts its application in industry [29]. Obfuscation and
perturbation are two similar data processing methods. In particular, obfus-
cation methods aggregate a number of random noises with real users rating
to preserve user’s sensitive information. Parameswaran et al. [22] proposed
an obfuscation framework which exchanges the sets of similar items before
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submitting the user data to CF server. Weinsberg et al. [27] introduced extra
reasonable ratings into user’s profile against inferring user’s sensitive infor-
mation. Perturbation methods modify the user’s original ratings by a se-
lected probability distribution before using these ratings. Particularly, Bilge
et al. [4] added uniform distribution noise to the real ratings before the util-
isation of user’s rating in prediction process. While, Basu et al. [3] regarded
the deviation between two items as the adding noise. Both perturbation and
obfuscation obtain good trade-off between prediction accuracy and system
security due to the tiny data perturbation, but the magnitude of noise or
the percentage of replaced ratings are not easy to be calibrated [9,29]. The
probabilistic method [1] applied weighted sampling in neighbour selection
which preserves users’ privacy against kNN successfully; however, it cannot
provide enough accuracy due to its global randomness. Because the per-
formance of the neighbourhood-based CF methods largely depends on the
quality of neighbours. We suppose the top k neighbour as the highest quality
neighbour set, the randomised weighted selection process will return neigh-
bours with lower similarity with a high probability. Then the prediction
accuracy will be impacted significantly [29]. Therefore, achieving a trade-off
between privacy and utility, while calibrating the adding noise are difficult
tasks for these techniques.
2.2 Differential Privacy Recommender Systems
As a well-known privacy definition, the differential privacy technology [7]
has been applied in the research of privacy preserving recommender sys-
tems. For example, McSherry et al. [19] provided the first differential privacy
neighbourhood-based CF recommendation algorithm. In fact, their naive
differential privacy protects the neighbourhood-based CF recommender sys-
tems against kNN attack successfully, as they added Laplace noise into the
covariance (similarity between users/items) matrix globally, so that the out-
put k nearest neighbours set is no longer the original top k neighbours.
However, the global noise decreases the accuracy of their recommendation
algorithms significantly.
Another differential privacy neighbourhood-based CF recommender sys-
tems algorithm is proposed by Zhu et al. [29] which inspired this study. It
aims to provide better prediction accuracy than McSherry et al. [19] while
aiming to keep differential privacy at both neighbour selection stage and
rating prediction stage. They proposed a Private Neighbour Collaborative
Filtering (PNCF) by introducing exponential differential privacy [20] to the
process of neighbour selection to guarantee the system security against kNN
attack. After selecting the k neighbours, same with McSherry et al. [19],
they also added Laplace noise into the similarity matrix to make the final
prediction.
Unlike the k nearest neighbour method which selects the k most similar
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candidates, the PNCF method [29] randomly selects the k neighbours with
each candidate ui’s weight ωi. According to exponential mechanism of dif-
ferential privacy, the selection weight is measured by a score function and
its corresponding sensitivity as follow,
ωi = exp(

4k ×RSqa(U(ua), ui)), (1)
where q is the score function, RS is the Recommendation-Aware Sensitivity
of score function q for any user pairs ui and uj ,  is differential privacy
parameter, and U(ua) is the set of user ua’s candidate list. For a user ua,
the score function q and its Recommendation-Aware Sensitivity are defined
as follows:
qa(U(ua), ui) = simai, (2)
RS = max
{
max
s∈Sij
(
ris·rjs
‖r′i‖‖r′j‖
)
, max
s∈Sij
(
ris·rjs(‖ri‖‖rj‖−‖r′i‖‖r′j‖)
‖ri‖‖rj‖‖r′i‖‖r′j‖
)}
, (3)
where ris is user ui’s rating on item ts, simai is the similarity between user
ua and ui, ri is user ui’s average rating on every item, Sij is the set of all
items co-rated by both users i and j, i.e., Sij = {s ∈ S|ris 6= ∅ & rjs 6= ∅}.
However, the above naive differential privacy neighbour selection is nearly
the same to the probabilistic neighbour selection [1]. To address the above
problem of low prediction accuracy in [1], a truncated parameter λ was in-
troduced in [29]. Simply speaking, the candidates whose similarity is greater
than (sim(a, k) +λ) are selected to the neighbour set, while, whose similar-
ity is less than (sim(a, k)− λ) will not be selected, where sim(a, k) denotes
the similarity of user ua’s kth neighbour. Theorem 3.1 in [29] provided an
equation to calculate the value of λ, i.e. λ = min(sim(a, k), 4k·RS ln
k(n−k)
ρ ),
where ρ is a constant, 0 < ρ < 1.
However, we observe that the above idea in [29] has three weaknesses.
Firstly, it adds random noise in the process of neighbour selection twice;
however, it is not necessary. Because we can preserve privacy against kNN
successfully only by introducing randomness once, the extra randomness will
decrease the prediction accuracy significantly. Secondly, the value of λ may
not be achievable. This is because when computing the value of λ by ρ, it
results in a good theoretical recommendation accuracy, but does not yield
a good experimental recommendation accuracy on the given test datasets
in [29]. So the PNCF method [29] will actually be a method of Global Prob-
abilistic Neighbour Selection [1] and cannot guarantee any recommendation
accuracy. Thirdly, the PNCF scheme breaks differential privacy in the pro-
cess of neighbour selection. Suppose there is a tiny change in the dataset,
then the value of similarity between target user ua and other users ui in
the candidate list will change. There may exist a user uc whose probability
of being selected may change from 0 to x > 0, then the ratio between the
two probabilities will be 0 or infinite, none of which satisfy Definition 1 in
Section 3.2.
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3 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the foundational concepts and mathematical
model related with this paper in collaborative filtering, differential privacy,
and Wallenius’ non-central hyper-geometric distribution.
3.1 k Nearest Neighbour Collaborative Filtering
A collaborative filtering based recommender system predicts users’ poten-
tial preferences by aggregating the relevant historical data. Collaborative
filtering, a popular technique in recommender systems, is in three categories:
neighbourhood-based methods, association rules based methods, and matrix
factorisation methods [17]. The neighbourhood-based methods generally
provides recommendations by combining the opinions of a user’s k nearest
neighbours [2].
Neighbour Selection and Rating Prediction are two main stages in neighbourhood-
based CF [29]. At the Neighbour Selection stage, a target user ua’s neigh-
bours are selected according to their similarity value in the target user ua’s
similarity array Sa, where similarities between any two users/items are cal-
culated by a measurement metric. Two of the most popular similarity mea-
surement metrics are the Pearson correlation coefficient and Cosine-based
Similarity [2]. In kNN method, we select the k most similar neighbours of a
target user/item.
(1) Pearson Correlation Coefficient (user-based):
simij =
∑
s∈Sij (ris − r¯i)(rjs − r¯j)√∑
s∈Sij (ris − r¯i)2
∑
s∈Sij (rjs − r¯j)2
, (4)
(2) Cosin-based Similarity (user-based):
simij = cos(ri, rj) =
ri·rj
‖ri‖×‖rj‖
=
∑
s∈Sij risrjs√∑
s∈Sij r
2
is
√∑
s∈Sij r
2
js
,
(5)
where ris is user ui’s rating on item ts, ris ∈ R, R is the user-item rating
dataset, simij is the similarity between user ui and user uj , r¯i is user ui’s
average rating on every item, Sij is the set of all items co-rated by both
users i and j, i.e., Sij = {s ∈ S|ris 6= ∅ & rjs 6= ∅}.
At the stage of Rating Prediction in user-based CF methods, the pre-
dicted rating rˆax of user ua on item tx is calculated as an aggregation of
other users’ rating on item tx [2, 29]. The prediction of rˆax is computed as
follow:
rˆax =
∑
ui∈Nk(ua) sim(a, i)rix∑
ui∈Nk(ua) |sim(a, i)|
, (6)
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where, Nk(ua) is a sorted set which contains user ua’s k nearest neighbours,
Nk(ua) is sorted by similarity in a descending order, sim(a, i) is the ith
neighbour of ua in Nk(ua).
3.2 Differential Privacy
Informally, differential privacy [7,8] is a scheme that minimises the sensitivity
of output for a given statistical operation on two different (differentiated in
one record to protect) datasets. Specifically, differential privacy guarantees
no matter whether one specific record appears in a database, the privacy
mechanism will shield the specific record to the adversary. The strategy of
differential privacy is adding a random noise to the result of a query function
on the database.
To understand the spirit of differential privacy clearly, several items will
be introduced in advance. Firstly, X(x1, x2, · · · , xn) and X ′(x′1, x′2, · · · , x′n)
are two databases with n entries which differ in only one entry, where xi
and x′1 are the ith entry of X and X ′. We call X and X ′ are neighbouring
dataset. Secondly, f(X) is the query function on database X, the respond
is the combination of the real answer a = f(X) and a chosen random noise.
Thirdly, the privacy mechanism T , namely, the respond, is computed by
T (X) = f(X) +Noise. A formal definition of Differential Privacy is shown
as follow:
Definition 1 (-Differential Privacy [7]). A randomised mechanism T is
-differential privacy if for all neighbouring datasets X and X ′, and for
all outcome sets S ⊆ Range(T ), T satisfies: Pr[T (X) ∈ S] ≤ exp() ·
Pr[T (X ′) ∈ S], where  is a privacy budget.
The privacy budget  is set by the database owner. Usually, a smaller
 denotes a higher privacy guarantee because the privacy budget  reflects
the magnitude of difference between two neighbouring datasets.
There are two main applications of the randomised mechanism T : the
Laplace mechanism [7] and the Exponential mechanism [20]. The definitions
are shown as below:
Definition 2 (Laplace Mechanism [7]). Let a query function f : R →
Rd, the -differential privacy mechanism T obeys that T (X) = f(X) +
Lap−1(∆f ,Pr)
d, where the sensitivity of function f , ∆f = max |f(X)− f(X ′)|,
for all neighbouring datasets X, X ′ ∈ Dn, and d represents the dimension.
Definition 3 (Exponential Mechanism [20]). Given a score function of a
database X, q(X,x), which reflects the score of query respond x. The expo-
nential mechanism T provides -differential privacy, if T (X) = {the prob-
ability of a query respond x ∝ exp( ·q(X,x)2∆q )}, where ∆q = max |q(X,x) −
q(X ′, x)|, denotes the sensitivity of q.
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3.3 Wallenius’ Non-central Hyper-geometric Distribution
Wallenius’ non-central hyper-geometric distribution is a distribution of weighted
sampling without replacement. Formally, it is defined as follow [13]: We as-
sume there are c distinct categories in the population, each category contains
mi individuals, i ∈ [1, c]. All the individuals from category i have the same
weight ωi, i ∈ [1, c]. The probability of an individual is sampled at a given
draw is proportional to its weight ωi. Let xv = (x1v, x2v, . . . , xcv) denote
the total number of the individuals in each colour sampled after the first v
draws. The probability that the next draw gives a individual of colour i is:
pi(v+1)(xv) =
(mi − xiv)ωi∑c
j=1(mj − xjv)ωj
. (7)
The weighted sampling process without replacement is repeatedly until k
individuals have been retained, namely, k =
∑c
i=1 xi, where xi denotes the
number of individuals sampled from category i by Wallenius’ non-central
hypergeometric distribution.
Wallenius [26] proposed the probability mass function for this distribu-
tion in the univariate case (c = 2). Chesson [6] expanded Wallenius’s solu-
tion to the multivariate case (c > 2). In this paper, we focus on the mul-
tivariate Wallenius’ non-central hyper-geometric distribution’s probability
mass function because we regard one user/item in a recommender system as
one individual in Wallenius’ non-central hyper-geometric distribution. The
multivariate probability mass function (PMF) is shown as blow:
mwnchypg = Λ(x)I(x), (8)
where Λ(x) =
∏c
i=1
(
mi
xi
)
, I(x) =
∫ 1
0
∏c
i=1(1 − tωi/d)xidt, d = ω · (m −
x) =
∑c
i=1 ωi(mi − xi), x = (x1, x2, . . . , xc), m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mc), ω =
(ω1, ω2, . . . , ωc).
While in this paper, we mainly use the following properties to evaluate
different probabilistic relevant approaches. Manly [18] gave the approxi-
mated solution µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, . . . ,
µ∗c) to the mean µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µc) of x after the final draw:(
1− µ
∗
1
m1
)1/ω1
=
(
1− µ
∗
2
m2
)1/ω2
= . . . =
(
1− µ
∗
c
mc
)1/ωc
, (9)
where
∑c
i=1 µ
∗
i = k, ∀i ∈ C : 0 ≤ µ∗i ≤ mi.
Fog [12] stated the following properties of Equation (9): firstly, the so-
lution µ∗ is valid under the conditions that ∀i ∈ C : mi > 0 and ωi > 0.
Secondly, the mean given by Equation (9) is a good approximation in most
cases. Thirdly, Equation (9) is exact when all ωi are equal.
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4 A Generalised Privacy Attack for Recommender
Systems
In this section, we firstly introduce a popular attack, k nearest neighbour at-
tack, then we expand the concept to a general attack, β-k nearest neighbour
attack.
4.1 k Nearest Neighbour Attack
Calandrino et al. [5] stated a user-based attack called k Nearest Neighbour
(kNN) attack. Simply, the kNN attack exploits the property that the users
are more similar when sharing same rating on corresponding items to reveal
user’s private data.
We assume that the recommendation algorithm (kNN CF recommen-
dation) and its parameter k are known to the attacker. Furthermore, the
attacker’s auxiliary information consists of a target user ua’s partial history
rating values, i.e., he already knows the ratings of m items that ua has rated.
Usually, m ≈ 8. He aims to catch ua’s transactions that he does not yet
know about.
To achieve this goal, the attacker firstly creates k fake users who have the
same ratings with ua only on the m items. With a high probability, each fake
user’s k nearest neighbours set Nk(fake user) will include the other k−1 fake
users and the target user ua. Because the target user ua is the only neighbour
who has ratings on the items which are not rated by the fake users, to provide
recommendations on these items to the fake users, the recommender system
has to give ua’s rating to the fake users directly. Obviously, the fake users
learn the target user ua’s whole rating list successfully with kNN attack.
4.2 β-k Nearest Neighbours Attack
According to the existing privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF rec-
ommendation methods, we expand the kNN attack to a more general case,
named β-k Nearest Neighbour (β-kNN) attack.
As we know, to preserve the target user ua’s private information against
kNN attack, we should avoid selecting the true k nearest neighbours, so the
existing methods applied the randomness techniques. However, suppose the
final k neighbours are selected from the top βk users of ua’s candidate list,
also the parameters β and k are known to the attacker, the attacker would
catch ua’s private data with a high probability by creating βk fake users.
When β is not great enough, it is still not difficult to break the privacy
preserving neighbourhood-based CF recommender systems. Therefore, the
β-kNN attack can flexibly adjust the size of fake user’s set to improve the
attack effectiveness. Actually, kNN attack can be regarded as 1-kNN attack
in the expanded case of β-kNN attack.
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In β-kNN attack, β can be treated because a security measure as a
greater value of β represents a higher fraud cost. We will show the relation-
ship between the prediction utility and β in Section 6.
5 Privacy Preservation by Partitioned Probabilis-
tic Neighbour Selection
In this section, we firstly provide two performance metrics on the privacy
preserving neighbourhood-based CF recommender systems against β-kNN
attack. Then we propose our Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection
algorithm based on the previous analysis.
5.1 Performance Metrics
5.1.1 Accuracy Metric
For any privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF recommender systems,
if the sum of similarity of the selected k neighbours is greater, the predicted
rating value will be better. The reason is simple: the neighbour is closer to
the target user ua means the predicted result is more reliable, namely, we
prefer the method which selects the greater similarity sum. Therefore, we
define the accuracy metric α as the sum of k selected neighbours’ similarity.
Because we propose a random neighbour selection method, the accuracy
metric α should be regarded as the expected sum of k selected neighbours’
similarity. However, it is not obvious to directly compute the expectation
of the k neighbours similarity sum: E(
∑
i∈Nk(ua) sim(a, i)), as we need to
find all the user combinations and corresponding probabilities. So we give
another way to compute this expectation,
E(
∑
i∈Nk(ua)
sim(a, i)) =
n∑
i=1
(sim(a, i)E(xi)) =
n∑
i=1
sim(a, i)µi, (10)
see Section 3.3 for the definition of xi and µi. So we compute the accuracy
by the following equation in this paper:
α =
n∑
i=1
sim(a, i)µi. (11)
5.1.2 Security Metric
According to the β-kNN attack, suppose the final k neighbours are selected
from the top βk users of ua’s candidate list. We assume that the parameters
β and k are known to the attacker, so the attacker would catch ua’s privacy
with a high probability through the same process of kNN attack by creating
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βk fake users. When β’s value is not great, it is still not difficult to break
the privacy preserving recommender systems. Therefore, we define β as the
security metric, the greater value of β denotes the higher fraud cost for the
attacker, namely, we want to achieve a trade-off between the security metric
β and a fixed prediction accuracy metric α.
5.2 Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection Algorithm
According to the motivation and previous analysis, we provide an original
version of our Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection algorithm. We
firstly partition the a target user’s candidate list (descending order of sim-
ilarity value) by the given k, then apply a geometric distribution on the
candidate list to select dp(1 − p)i−1ke neighbours (apply exponential dif-
ferential privacy in every partition) from partition i until we have a total
of k neighbours, where integer i ∈ [1,+∞), p is a geometric distribution
parameter. It is clear that our original partitioned probabilistic neighbour
scheme satisfies property (1) (easy implementation) in Section 1, for it does
not introduce any extra computational cost. In fact, it is natural to regard
the low neighbour quality as the noise in the process of neighbour selection,
since the low neighbour quality has the same impact on the prediction ac-
curacy as the noise. So our method satisfies property (3) (decreasing the
magnitude of noise) in Section 1 in two ways: 1. it only adds noise in the
process of neighbour selection. 2. it controls the neighbour quality by tuning
the geometric distribution parameter p in the process of neighbour selection.
However, the original version does not satisfy the property (2) (keeping dif-
ferential privacy) and (4) (quantifying the accuracy and security), we now
show the reasons and modify it to satisfy the property (2) and (4).
In the original version, we select dp(1 − p)i−1ke neighbours with ex-
ponential differential privacy from partition i until we have k neighbours.
Actually, it breaks differential privacy with the same reason (see details in
Section 2.2) of the PNCF method [29]. Simply speaking, there may exist
some users whose probability of selection will be changed from zero to a
positive number because of a tiny change in rating set. To guarantee the
prediction accuracy, we only modify the original scheme by changing the way
we select the last neighbour (see details in next paragraph). The modified
scheme keeps absolute differential privacy because no matter how we change
the dataset, every candidate’s probability of selection cannot be zero. To
quantify the level of recommendation accuracy and system security, we use
the performance metrics α and β. We compute the parameter p and the
security metric β by a given α by Equation (20).
Algorithm 1 shows the Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection
(PPNS) algorithm. In lines 1 to 5, we compute the necessary parame-
ters by Equation (5), (3), (2), (1) and (20). In lines 6 to 18, we select
the k neighbours by Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection, then re-
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turn the target user’s k neighbours and the security metric value β. We
firstly mark all of the partitions as unvisited. Next, we select dp(1− p)i−1ke
neighbours with exponential differential privacy from partition i (mark this
partition as visited) until we have a total of k − 1 neighbours. Finally, we
select the last neighbour from all the unvisited partitions.
Algorithm 1 Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection.
Input:
Original user-item rating set, R;
Target user, ua and prediction item, tx;
Number of neighbours, k;
Differential privacy parameter, ;
Accuracy metric, α.
Output:
Target user ua’s k-neighbour set, Nk(ua);
Security metric, β.
1: Compute the similarity list for target user ua, Sa;
2: Sort Sa in descending order, Sa;
3: Compute exponential differential privacy sensitivity, RS;
4: Compute user ui’s selection weight, ωi;
5: Compute the geometric distribution parameter, p;
6: Partition the sorted Sa by k;
7: for i = 1 to n do
8: if Neighbour Number 6= k − 1 then
9: Select dp(1− p)i−1ke neighbours from partition i to Nk(ua);
10: Mark partition i as visited;
11: Neighbour Number += dp(1− p)i−1ke;
12: else
13: break;
14: end if
15: end for
16: Select one neighbour from unvisited partitions;
17: β = last neighbour’s partition index number;
18: return Nk(ua), β;
6 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we use multivariate Wallenius’ non-central hyper-geometric
distribution to analyse any randomised neighbour selection methods on both
performance of accuracy and security against kNN attack theoretically. The
reason is both multivariate Wallenius’ non-central hyper-geometric distri-
bution and randomised neighbour selection methods are weighted sampling
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without replacement, the samples are selected one by one from universe,
and the sampling weight is only depends on each sample’s attribute, i.e.,
the ball’s colour or user’s similarity.
6.1 Accuracy Analysis
In this part, to analyse the accuracy performance, we will firstly modify
the Equation (9) to match with a general randomised neighbour selection
method. As the selection weight in a general probabilistic neighbour selec-
tion method only relies on the user’s similarity, we regard user ui’s similarity
sim(a, i) as the sample’s colour in multivariate Wallenius’ non-central hyper-
geometric distribution. Thus in randomised neighbour selection methods,
mi = 1, c = n, N =
∑c
i=1mi =
∑n
i=1mi = n. Therefore, we rewrite the
Equation (9) as:
A = (1− µ1)1/ω1 = (1− µ2)1/ω2 = . . . = (1− µn)1/ωn , (12)
where A is a constant.
Now we start evaluating the Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selec-
tion by Equation (12). To make it easy, we also partition the candidate list
in PNCF method [29] and Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1] by the given
k.
Lemma 1. C is an n sized set. We independently sample several samples
with multivariate Wallenius’ non-central hyper-geometric distribution from
C twice, suppose µi and µˆi are the expected number of sample i from the two
samplings. Then ∀i ∈ [1, n], µi > µˆi ⇔
∑n
i=1 µi >
∑n
i=1 µˆi.
Proof. Let
∑n
i=1 µi = X,
∑n
i=1 µˆi = Xˆ, A = (1− µi)1/ωi , Aˆ = (1− µˆi)1/ωi .
(1) Proof of sufficient condition, µi > µˆi ⇒
∑n
i=1 µi >
∑n
i=1 µˆi:
∵ the size of the set C keep the same.
∴ ∀i ∈ [1, n], µi > µˆi ⇒
∑n
i=1 µi >
∑n
i=1 µˆi.
(2) Proof of Necessary condition,
∑n
i=1 µi >
∑n
i=1 µˆi ⇒ µi > µˆi:
According to Equation (12), we have,
A = (1− µi)1/ω1 ⇒ µi = 1−A1/ω1
⇒ ∑ni=1 µi = k −∑ni=1A1/ω1 = X.
Similarly, k −∑ni=1 Aˆ1/ω1 = Xˆ.
∵ X =
∑n
i=1 µi >
∑n
i=1 µˆi = Xˆ, and µi and µˆi share the same ωi,
∴
∑n
i=1A
1/ω1 <
∑n
i=1 Aˆ
1/ω1
⇒ A < Aˆ
⇒ (1− µi)1/ω1 < (1− µˆi)1/ω1
⇒ µi > µˆi.
Therefore, we have ∀i ∈ [1, n], µi > µˆi ⇔
∑n
i=1 µi >
∑n
i=1 µˆi.
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Lemma 1 shows the fact that when selecting neighbours with multivariate
Wallenius’ non-central hyper-geometric distribution by several randomised
neighbour selection methods from a same sized partition, if one method
selects more neighbours, then the expected number of each neighbour in
that method is greater too, and vice versa.
Lemma 2. The method, which selects more users from the first partition
(contains user u1 to uk) of a descending order similarity list, yields a better
rating prediction, i.e.,
∑k
i=1 µi >
∑k
i=1 µˆi ⇒ α ≥ αˆ, where α denotes the
accuracy metric value.
Proof. Let Xj =
∑
i∈groupj µi, Xˆj =
∑
i∈groupj µˆi, e.g., X1 =
∑
i∈group1 µi =∑k
i=1 µi. Assume an extreme case:
X1 > Xˆ1
X2 < Xˆ2
X3 < Xˆ3
... <
...
∵ k =
∑
j Xj =
∑
j Xˆj ,
∴ X1 − Xˆ1 = (Xˆ2 −X2) + (Xˆ3 −X3) + · · · .
It is obvious that, in both sides of the above equation, every item > 0.
According to Lemma 1, X > Xˆ ⇔ µi > µˆi, we have,∑
group1
(µi− µˆi) =
∑
group2
(µˆi−µi) +
∑
group3
(µˆi−µi) + · · · , and every
(·) > 0.
∵ 1 ≥ sim(a, i) ≥ sim(a, j) ≥ 0, (i < j),
∴
∑
group1
sim(a, i)(µi − µˆi) ≥
∑
group2
sim(a, i)(µˆi − µi)
+
∑
group3
sim(a, i)(µˆi − µi)
+ · · ·
.
∴
∑n
i=1 sim(a, i)µi ≥
∑n
i=1 sim(a, i)µˆi. According to Equation (11), we
have α ≥ αˆ.
Therefore, the method, which selects more users from the first group, is
more reliable on the predicted rating value.
Theorem 1. If p > 1−(n−kn )ω1, the recommendation accuracy performance
of Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection is better than PNCF method
[29] and Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1].
Proof. We firstly demonstrate the best case for the PNCF method [29] and
Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1]: sim(a, 1) = · · · = sim(a, k) = 1 >
0 = sim(a, k + 1) = · · · = sim(a, n).
∴ k = kµ1 + (n− k)µn.
According to Equation (12), A = (1− µ1)1/ω1 = (1− µn)1/ωn , µn =
1 − (1 − µ1)1/ω1 . Let ∆ = µ1 − µn = (1 − µ1)1/ω1 − (1 − µ1), then µ1 =
k
n +
(n−k)∆
n <
k
n + ∆, namely, µ1 <
k
n + (1 − µ1)1/ω1 − (1 − µ1), then µ1 <
1− (n−kn )ω1 .
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In PNCF method [29] and Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1],
∑
i∈group1 µi ≤
kµ1, while in Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection,
∑
i∈group1 µi =
pk. Therefore, according to Lemma 2, when p > 1−(n−kn )ω1 , α ≥ αˆ, namely,
the recommendation accuracy of Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selec-
tion is better than PNCF method [29] and Probabilistic Neighbour Selec-
tion [1].
Since we have qualitatively analysed the recommendation accuracy per-
formance between Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection and PNCF
method [29] and Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1], now we provide the
quantitative analysis of our Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection.
Let α0 be the initial accuracy metric.
∵
∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)µi∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
−
∑k
i=1 µi∑k
i=1 1
=
∑k−1
i=1
∑k
j=i+1(sim(a,i)−sim(a,j))(µiµj)
k
∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
≥ 0,
then we have
∑k
i=1 µi∑k
i=1 1
≤
∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)µi∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
.
Namely, p = pkk =
∑k
i=1 µi∑k
i=1 1
≤
∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)µi∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
≤
∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)µi+
∑2k
i=k+1 sim(a,i)µi+···∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
= α0∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
.
Thus, p ≤ α0∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
. Namely, when p ≥ α0∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
the actual accu-
racy α must be greater than α0. Therefore, we give the range of p’s value
to guarantee the accuracy metric α ≥ α0, p ∈ [ α0∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
, 1].
6.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we firstly provide the range of p, so that our approach guar-
antees the system security against kNN attack. Next, we present the quan-
titative analysis by providing a relationship between the the probabilistic
parameter p and the security metric β.
In PNCF method [29], according to Equation (8), the probability mass
function is:
PMF = I(x) =
∫ 1
0
n∏
i=1
(1− tωi/d)xidt, (13)
d = ω · (m− x) =
n∑
i=1
ωi(1− xi), (14)
where, x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn).
For the case of selecting the top-k users, we have:
xi =
{
1 i∈[1,k]
0 i ∈ [k + 1, n] . (15)
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Thus, the probability of selecting top-k users in PNCF method [29] and
Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1] is:
Pr = I(x) =
∫ 1
0
k∏
i=1
(1− tωi/d)dt > 0, (16)
d = ω · (m− x) =
n∑
i=k+1
ωi. (17)
In Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection, because we actually select
dpke users from the top-k users, when p ≤ k−1k , the probability of selecting
top-k users as the final k neighbours is 0, namely, we provide the absolute
security against the kNN attack when setting p ≤ k−1k .
To compute the value of β according to our selection process, we select
p(1− p)i−1k users from group i, so the first time we select one user from a
group, the number j of this group obeys the following inequation:
p(1− p)j−1k < 32
⇒ j > 1 + (ln 3−ln 2)−ln pkln(1−p) .
(18)
Before the group j + 1, we have selected pk+ p(1− p)k+ · · ·+ p(1− p)j−1k
users, there are (1 − p)j−1k users can be selected. Since the each of the
(1−p)j−1k comes from one group, the total number of the groups where the
k neighbours come from is:
β = (j − 1) + (1−p)j−1k1
= (j − 1) + (1− p)j−1k. (19)
6.3 Analysis Results
According to the previous analysis, when setting the probabilistic parameter
p as 1− (n−kn )ω1 < p ≤ k−1k , our Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selec-
tion achieve better performance of recommendation accuracy than Private
Neighbour Selection [29] and Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1]. Then we
give the the relationship between the accuracy metric α and security met-
ric β of our Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection by the following
equation: 
p ∈ [ α0∑k
i=1 sim(a,i)
, 1]
j =
⌈
1 + (ln 3−ln 2)−ln pkln(1−p)
⌉
β = (j − 1) + (1− p)j−1k
(20)
We guarantee to achieve α0 accuracy against β-kNN attack.
17
6.4 A representative Example
In this section, we show a simple but representative example of the range of
the probabilistic parameter p. Suppose k = θn, θ ∈ (0, 1], we know the lower
bound of p, 1− (n−kn )ω1 = 1− (1− θ)ω1 , is a monotone-increasing function
of θ. Because the value of θ is always small(k ∈ [30, 50] and n is always
greater than 1000), the value of the lower bound of p will be very small. In
the mean time, consider the upper bound of p, it would be a number close
to 1. Therefore, the range of value p is very large in the set of (0, 1).
Now we will show an example in a real scenario. Let k = 50, n = 500,
 = 1, RS = 1, so the lower bound of p would be
1−
(
n− k
n
)exp( 
4k×RS )
= 1−
(
500− 50
500
)exp( 1
4×50×1 )
≈ 0.1, (21)
and the upper bound of p would be k−1k =
50−1
50 = 0.98. Thus, in the above
real scenario, when we set p in the range of (0.1, 0.98] ⊂ [0, 1), the Parti-
tioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection would yield better performance of
recommendation accuracy against kNN attack.
7 Performance Evaluation
In Section 6, we theoretically analyse the performance on both recommen-
dation accuracy and system security, and prove that to successfully preserve
customer’s privacy against kNN attack, our method ensures a better perfor-
mance of recommendation accuracy than the PNCF method [29] and Prob-
abilistic Neighbour Selection [1]. In this section, we compare the recommen-
dation accuracy between Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection and
global Neighbour Selection [29] and Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1] by
the experiments on real world dataset.
The dataset in the experiments is the MovieLens dataset1. The Movie-
Lens dataset consists of 100,000 ratings (1-5 integral stars) from 943 users
on 1682 films, where each user has voted more than 20 films, and each film
received 20−250 users’ rating. Specifically, we randomly select one rating
of a random user, and then predict this user’s potential value by k Nearest
Neighbour (kNN), Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection (PPNS),
Probabilistic Neighbour Selection (nPNS) [1], Private Neibgbhour Selection
Collaborative Filtering (PNCF) [29].
In this paper, we use a famous measurement metric, Mean Absolute
Error (MAE) [28,29], to measure the recommendation accuracy:
MAE =
1
T
∑
i∈T
|rai − rˆai|, (22)
1http://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/
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where rai is the real rating of user ua on item ti, and rˆai is the predicting
rating, T is the test times. To guarantee a reasonable experimental result,
in our experiments, rai 6= 0. Clearly, a lower MAE value denotes a better
prediction accuracy. Note that in each experiment, we consider the kNN
CF recommendation method as a baseline (the best method on accuracy
performance).
In our experiments, we compute the parameter RS by the previous the-
ory [29]. We set T = 10, 000, namely, we do the experiments 10,000 times
to compute the MAE. Specifically, we randomly select one target user and
item at each time. Our experiments are run on user-based CF (because both
kNN attack and β-kNN attack are user-based attack), and we use the cosine-
based metric to compute the similarity between users. Table 1 and Figure
1 show the relationship between accuracy performance of Partitioned Prob-
abilistic Neighbour Selection and parameter p, where we set  = 1, k = 50,
ρ = 0.5. Table 2 and Figure 2 show the relationship between security per-
formance of Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection (value of β) and
parameter k, where the total partition number is 19. Table 3 and Figure 3
show the relationship between accuracy performance of all the four methods
and parameter k, where we set  = 1, p = 0.5, ρ = 0.5. Table 4 and Figure
4 show the relationship between accuracy performance of PNCF [29] and
parameter ρ, where we set  = 1, p = 0.5, k = 50.
p
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PNCF
PPNS
Figure 1: Impacts of p on accuracy
( = 1, k = 50, ρ = 0.5)
p 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
kNN 0.6956 0.7027 0.6908 0.6835 0.7074
PPNS 0.8333 0.7813 0.7289 0.7134 0.7085
nPNS 0.8762 0.8918 0.8884 0.8797 0.8878
PNCF 0.8798 0.8928 0.8885 0.8738 0.8753
p 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
kNN 0.6849 0.6899 0.6847 0.6746 0.6897
PPNS 0.6872 0.6914 0.6854 0.6792 0.6897
nPNS 0.8863 0.8889 0.8873 0.8781 0.8893
PNCF 0.8790 0.8845 0.8869 0.8783 0.8940
Table 1: Impacts of p on accuracy
( = 1, k = 50, ρ = 0.5)
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β
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PPNS
Figure 2: Impacts of p on security
(total partition number = 19)
p 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
kNN 1 1 1 1 1
PPNS 15 13 10 8 7
nPNS 17 17 17 17 17
PNCF 17 17 17 17 17
p 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
kNN 1 1 1 1 1
PPNS 6 5 3 2 1
nPNS 17 17 17 17 17
PNCF 17 17 17 17 17
Table 2: Impacts of p on security
(total partition number = 19)
k
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PNCF
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Figure 3: Impacts of k on accuracy
( = 1, p = 0.5, ρ = 0.5)
k 10 20 30 40 50
kNN 0.8065 0.7149 0.7288 0.6942 0.6957
PPNS 0.8962 0.8017 0.7716 0.7395 0.7430
nPNS 0.9687 0.9131 0.9034 0.8867 0.8904
PNCF 0.9856 0.9245 0.9094 0.8862 0.8941
k 60 70 80 90 100
kNN 0.6644 0.6679 0.6574 0.6699 0.6746
PPNS 0.7140 0.7225 0.7140 0.7258 0.7362
nPNS 0.8698 0.8695 0.8592 0.8599 0.8604
PNCF 0.8669 0.8687 0.8528 0.8624 0.8650
Table 3: Impacts of k on accuracy
( = 1, p = 0.5, ρ = 0.5)
ρ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
M
AE
0.65
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0.85
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Figure 4: Impacts of ρ on accuracy
( = 1, p = 0.5, k = 50)
ρ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
kNN 0.6815 0.6962 0.6914 0.6740 0.6821
PPNS 0.7310 0.7326 0.7175 0.7160 0.7374
nPNS 0.8915 0.8817 0.8873 0.8770 0.8801
PNCF 0.8911 0.8841 0.8932 0.8778 0.8862
ρ 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
kNN 0.6725 0.6887 0.6808 0.6910
PPNS 0.7107 0.7289 0.7185 0.7196
nPNS 0.8657 0.8812 0.8701 0.8813
PNCF 0.8667 0.8837 0.8738 0.8733
Table 4: Impacts of ρ on accuracy
( = 1, p = 0.5, k = 50)
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According to the experiments results, we are clear that:
(1) From Fig. 1, when setting p > 1− (n−kn )ω1 , the accuracy perfor-
mance of Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection is always bet-
ter than the PNCF method [29] and Probabilistic Neighbour Selec-
tion [1]. When the value of p is close to 1, the performance of Par-
titioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection is close to kNN method.
Particularly, when p = 1, the Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Se-
lection method is the same as kNN method.
(2) From Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, the accuracy performance of the neighbourhood-
based CF methods largely depends on the quality of neighbours. Our
Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection method yields a better
trade-off between the recommendation accuracy and security, as when
we offer a better accuracy performance, we do not lose the security
much.
(3) From Fig. 3, the size of neighbour set impacts the accuracy per-
formance of all of the neighbourhood-based CF recommendation ap-
proaches. A large value of neighbour set size k yields a better accuracy
performance.
(4) From Fig. 4, the value of λ in [29] is not achievable because the value
of ρ does not impact the accuracy performance of PNCF [29].
8 Conclusion
Recommender systems play an important role in e-commerce. To protect
users’ private information during the process of filtering, the existing privacy
preserving neighbourhood-bases CF methods fail to protect users’ privacy
in rating prediction. The global probabilistic neighbour selection methods,
such as the PNCF method [29] and Probabilistic Neighbour Selection [1]
though can protect users’ privacy against kNN attack successfully, but pro-
vide no data utility guarantee. To overcome the weaknesses of the current
methods, we propose a novel privacy preserving neighbourhood-based CF
method, Partitioned Probabilistic Neighbour Selection, to ensure a required
recommendation accuracy while maintaining high system security against β-
kNN attack (generalisation of kNN attack). Theoretical and experimental
analysis show that to provide an accuracy-assured recommendation against
the most popular attack, kNN attack, our Partitioned Probabilistic Neigh-
bour Selection method yields a better trade-off between the recommendation
accuracy and system security than the PNCF methods [29] and Probabilistic
Neighbour Selection [1].
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